The Role of Education and Experience in CFO Career and Compensation by Chahyadi, Candra S. & Abusalim, Bahaa
Eastern Illinois University
The Keep
Faculty Research & Creative Activity Business, School of
January 2011
The Role of Education and Experience in CFO
Career and Compensation
Candra S. Chahyadi
Eastern Illinois University, cchahyadi@eiu.edu
Bahaa Abusalim
Eastern Illinois University
Follow this and additional works at: http://thekeep.eiu.edu/business_fac
Part of the Accounting Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Business, School of at The Keep. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Research &
Creative Activity by an authorized administrator of The Keep. For more information, please contact tabruns@eiu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Chahyadi, Candra S. and Abusalim, Bahaa, "The Role of Education and Experience in CFO Career and Compensation" (2011).
Faculty Research & Creative Activity. 14.
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/business_fac/14
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Role of Education and Experience in CFO Career and Compensation  
 
Candra Chahyadi 
Eastern Illinois University 
 
Bahaa Abusalim 
Eastern Illinois University 
 
 
 
We examine the educational and experience backgrounds of chief financial officers (CFOs) of large and 
medium firms and investigate how measures of education and experience affect CFO career and 
compensation. We find that, compared to medium firms, large firms have more CFOs with MBA degrees 
and fewer CFOs with M.Acc degrees or who are also CPAs, suggesting that large firms prefer CFOs with 
more general knowledge than CFOs with a specific knowledge. We also find that firm size and CFO’s 
tenure at their current company consistently dominate measures of education and experience in 
determining CFO compensation. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The role of the modern chief financial officer (CFO) has become increasingly complex, and CFOs are 
now subject to new responsibilities, especially since the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) in 2002. SOX requires chief executive officers (CEOs) and CFOs to certify and sign their firm’s 
financial statements and holds them personally financially responsible for any inaccuracies found in the 
financial statements. McConnell and Banks (2003) report that CFOs are now responsible for overseeing 
the company’s internal control compliance. Chappuis, Kim, and Roche (2008) find that not only stricter 
regulations, but also increased shareholder activism, higher shareholder expectations, the growing 
presence of blockholders, more active M&A activities, and more complex finance/accounting 
environment create a much more complicated environment in which CFOs operate. As a result, CFOs are 
more directly accountable for the company’s performance. Erhemjamts, Gupta, and Tumennasan (2009) 
find that the proportion of firms in which the CFO is one of the five highest paid executives in a company 
increased from 54% in 1994 to 93% in 2006. This finding shows the growing importance of the CFO 
position in the company and signals the shift of the CFO position from bookkeeper to top-level executive. 
Kahn (2002) reports that in addition to supervising all of the company’s financial functions, CFOs also 
carry out strategic planning for the company’s future. Undoubtedly, to succeed in this complex and 
rapidly changing business environment, a successful CFO needs the right education and experience.  
Finance or accounting students commonly express curiosity regarding the level of education and 
experience necessary to become a CFO. Any answer, however, is quite vague. Some suggest that internal 
work experience, for example as a controller or a treasurer, is an excellent stepping stone to becoming a 
CFO. Stuart (2002) reports that, in the post-SOX regulatory environment, CFOs with controller skills are 
at an advantage when they want to move to another company or switch industries. Others argue that 
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specific external work experience, such as having worked for one of the Big Four accounting firms, is 
crucial to become a CFO. It is, in fact, not uncommon for someone who work in a Big Four accounting 
firm to assume the CFO position at his or her client company. Although young professionals do not start 
at the executive level in a Big Four firm, they are, nonetheless, introduced to top executives at their client 
firms. These connections provide them with excellent networking opportunities that they can tap later in 
their career when they are pursuing a position as a CFO. In general, however, no consensus exists on the 
ideal work experience to pursue a career as a CFO.  
The most direct educational path toward becoming a CFO is equally unclear. Some CFOs holds a 
master of business administration (MBA); others pursue a master of accounting (M.Acc). Some CFOs 
also obtain a professional certification, most notably, as a certified public accountant (CPA). What 
education or training best prepares a CFO to navigate the increasingly complex financial environment? 
Despite its high costs, executive MBA programs are proliferating around the world because even 
seasoned executives are finding that they need new finance or accounting knowledge to succeed in the 
highly quantitative business world. In addition, O’Sullivan (2004) reports that after the SOX in 2002, 
executive recruiters favor CFO candidates with a CPA. In the midst of the complexity of the accounting 
environment created by SOX and the overall business environment created by the ever-increasing 
globalization of the marketplace, CFOs may choose to specialize in the study of accounting practices or 
broaden their vocation to include the more generalized study of business and finance.  
We address these issues by examining the work and education background in a sample of CFOs from 
medium and large firms (CFO biographical information for small firms is rarely available). Furthermore, 
to determine impact of education and work experience on a CFO’s career, we examine how different 
measures of CFOs’ education and experience affect their compensation, both in salary and in total 
compensation.  
We find that CFOs in large firms have different education characteristics from CFOs in medium 
firms. Our results show that large firms value CFOs with more general skills than CFOs with more 
specific accounting skills. Specifically, large firms have a higher proportion of CFOs with an MBA, 
compared to CFOs in medium firms. Interestingly, large firms have a lower proportion of CFOs with an 
M.Acc or CPA certification, compared to medium firms. In addition, we find that CFO compensation is 
mostly driven by the size of the firm, the CFO’s tenure at the current company, and previous experience 
as a CFO at another company. Conversely, CFOs’ education or experience showed little impact on CFO 
compensation. 
 
DATA 
 
Our sample consists of the S&P 500 firms (large firms, henceforth) and the S&P Mid Cap firms 
(medium firms, henceforth). We collect the 2009 CFO biography information from different sources such 
as the company proxy statement, Business Week, Reuters, and Forbes websites. The data include CFOs’ 
sex (SEX), age (AGE), and measures of education and professional certification, namely, whether a CFO 
holds an MBA (MBA), an M.Acc (MACC), or a CPA certification (CPA). We also collect measures of 
work experience, namely, experience as a controller (CONT), a treasurer (TREA), or a CFO in another 
company (PCFO), or in an accounting firm before joining the current firm as CFO (ACC).  
For the purpose of controlling the effect of experience on compensation, we collect the number of 
years that a CFO has been working at the current firm (EXP). We expect that a CFO with a longer tenure 
should have higher compensation. Anticipating that the characteristics of CFOs and the CFOs’ 
compensation may depend on the size of the firm, we use the firm’s total assets in 2010, taken from 
Compustat, as a control variable.  
For the CFO compensation data, we collect salary (SALARY) and total compensation (TCOMP) data 
reported to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission from the company proxy statement. We create 
dummy variables for SEX, MBA, MACC, CPA, CONT, TREA, PCFO, and ACC. Accordingly, the 
dummy variables take a value of 1 if a CFO is a man; has an MBA, an M.Acc, or CPA certification; has 
work experience as a controller, treasurer, or CFO in another company; or has work experience in an 
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accounting firm before joining the current firm as CFO, and zero otherwise. We use the natural log of 
salary for SALARY and the natural log of total compensation for TCOMP. 
For a control variable, we use size of the firm and define SIZE as the natural log of firm’s total assets. 
We exclude CFOs without any biography information from the sample. Our final sample consists of 790 
CFOs with available education and experience background.  
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of variables used in the sample. We divide the sample into 
two sub-samples: large firms and medium firms. Panels A, B, and C provide the descriptive sample 
statistics for the full sample, large firms, and medium firms, respectively. We find that more than 90% of 
the CFOs are men for both sub-samples (large firms = 92.08%; medium firms = 93.39%). The average 
age of all CFOs is 50.84 years and nearly identical for both sub-samples (large firms = 50.96 years; 
medium firms = 50.68 years). Compared to medium firms, large firms have a higher proportion of CFOs 
with an MBA (large firms = 44.80%; medium firms = 27.01%) and a lower proportion of CFOs with an 
M.Acc (large firms = 1.36%; medium firms = 4.02%). Large firms also have a lower proportion of CFOs 
with a CPA than medium firms (large firms = 30.77%; medium firms = 37.64%). (See Appendix Table 1) 
These data may suggest that as firm size (measured by total assets) increases, the business 
environment becomes more complex, thus requiring more divisions and subsidiaries. As a result, CFOs of 
large companies need not only accounting skills but also more general management skills. Therefore, 
large firms seek out CFOs who are trained in more general fields of knowledge (represented by CFOs 
with MBA degrees) than CFOs who are specialized in a specific field of knowledge (represented by CFOs 
with M.Acc degrees or CPA certification).  
Work experience as a controller seems to be a very important determinant in CFO career selection in 
both sub-samples (large firms = 63.35%; medium firms = 62.64%). However, less than one-half of the 
CFOs had prior work experience as a treasurer (large firms = 44.57%; medium firms = 45.40%). It 
appears that large firms prefer candidates who have prior work experience as a CFO more than medium 
firms (large firms = 52.71%; medium firms = 47.13%). In addition, medium firms have a higher 
proportion of CFOs who have worked in a Big Four accounting firm than large firms (large firms = 
35.92%; medium firms = 29.41%). This finding reinforces the argument that large firms value the CFOs 
with general knowledge skills and that medium firms gravitate toward CFOs with a specific skill sets.  
 
Univariate Regression Analysis 
We present the univariate correlations among variables in Table 2. The correlations between variables 
that are significant at 5% level are in bold. We find that, in general, the relation between salary 
(SALARY) and each of the measures of education and experience is insignificant at 5% level. This 
finding may be because company executives voluntarily choose to receive less in salary but more in other 
compensation forms such as bonus or stock options (some CEOs voluntarily choose to receive $1 in 
annual salary in exchange for higher bonuses or stock options). Therefore, we also look at the relation 
between total compensation and each of the measures of education and experience. In so doing, we see 
more statistically significant correlations between total compensation and measures of education and 
experience. As previously indicated in the discussion of our descriptive statistics, we again find that 
specific knowledge or certification such as holding an M.Acc, CPA certification, or work experience at a 
big accounting firm lower the total compensation of a CFO, whereas having a more general degree and 
experience such as an MBA or prior experience as a CFO increase the CFO total compensation. (See 
Appendix Table 2) 
Although we find evidence that male CFOs receive higher compensation than female CFOs, the 
correlation is insignificant at the 5% level for both sub-samples. Finally, we find positive and significant 
correlations between measures of compensation (SALARY and TCOMP) and CFO’s age. These results 
support the argument that older and more experienced CFOs are more highly compensated. 
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Multivariate Regression Analysis 
To examine how measures of CFOs’ education and experience affect compensation, we use two 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions where the dependent variables are salary and total compensation 
and the independent variables are measures of CFOs’ education and experience as previously defined. 
Using the univariate analysis, we find that the correlation between compensation (SALARY) and 
measures of CFO’s education and experience in general is insignificant. However, this result may be 
skewed if SALARY is not a good measure of modern CFO compensation. Therefore, we supplement the 
analysis by adding TCOMP as the dependent variable in this multivariate regression analysis. 
We control for the firm size and the number of years that a CFO has been working for the current 
company. Model 1 reports the OLS regression model using SALARY as the dependent variable: 
 
??????????0 ???1 ???????2 ???????3 ???????4 ?? ??????5 ???????6 ????????7 TREA  
???8 ????????9 ???????10 ????????11 ??????? (1) 
 
Model 2 reports the OLS regression model using total compensation as the dependent variable: 
 
?????????0 ???1 ???????2 ???????3 ???????4 ?????????5 ???????6 ????????7 TREA  
???8 ????????9 ???????10 ????????11 ???????? (2) 
 
We present results for the multivariate regression analysis in Table 3. Using SALARY as the 
dependent variable, we find that SALARY is mostly driven by the size of the company and by how long 
the CFO has been working at current company. This relation is found in the full sample and both the sub-
samples. We also find that previous work experience as a treasurer, in fact, reduces CFO compensation in 
the full sample and in the medium firm sample but not in the large firm sample. Finally, we find that 
having prior experience as a CFO at another company significantly increases the CFO compensation in 
the full sample and in the large firm sample but not in the medium firm sample. (See Appendix Table 3) 
Using TCOMP as the dependent variable, we re-run the regressions in all three samples. Interestingly, 
we find that CFOs receive higher total compensation when they have an MBA degree and that TCOMP 
declines for CFOs who hold an M.Acc or CPA certification. As before, prior experience as a CFO at 
another company increases CFO compensation. Further, we still find that a CFO’s tenure at his or her 
current company and the size of the company are very significant CFO compensation determinants. 
However, our evidence is mixed regarding how large and medium firms hire CFOs, and thus we are 
unable to draw definitive conclusions based on our CFO compensation data. Because the measures of 
compensation that we use in this study may not fully reflect the impact of varying degrees of education 
and experience, further study is required in this area of research.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We examine the CFO’s education and experience background in S&P 500 (large firms) and S&P Mid 
Cap firms (medium firms) and then investigate how those measures of education and experience affect 
CFO career and compensation. Compared to medium firms, large firms have more CFOs with an MBA 
and fewer CFOs with an M.Acc. In other words, large firms seem to prefer CFOs with more general 
knowledge than CFOs who are specialized in a specific field of knowledge. This preference argument 
also explains our finding that large firms employ fewer CFOs with a CPA than medium firms. We find 
that the size of the company as well as the CFO’s tenure at current company consistently dominate the 
measures of CFOs’ education and experience to explain CFO compensation. Due to our mixed results, we 
cannot draw definitive conclusions regarding how our measures of CFOs’ education and experience affect 
CFO compensation. We leave that to future examination.  
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE 1 
SUMMARY STATISTICS ON CFO VARIABLES 
 
 
 
Panel A: Full Sample                           
VARIABLE N   Q1   Mean   Median   Q3   Min   Max   
Std. 
Dev. 
SEX 790 1 0.927 1 1 0 1 0.261 
AGE 790 47 50.841 51 55 0 1 6.068 
MBA 790 0 0.370 0 1 0 1 0.483 
MACC 790 0 0.025 0 0 0 1 0.157 
CPA 790 0 0.338 0 1 0 1 0.473 
CONT 790 0 0.630 1 1 0 1 0.483 
TREA 790 0 0.449 0 1 0 1 0.498 
PCFO 790 0 0.503 1 1 0 1 0.503 
ACC 790 0 0.323 0 1 0 1 0.468 
EXP 790 2 5.297 4 7 0 28 4.467 
SIZE 790 7.772 8.795 8.601 9.666 5.876 14.434 1.391 
SALARY 790 12.858 13.145 13.108 13.385 10.297 15.919 0.528 
TCOMP 790   13.997   14.458   14.440   14.919   11.467   17.022   0.738 
Continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1 CONTINUED 
 
Panel B: Large Firms                           
VARIABLE N   Q1   Mean   Median   Q3   Min   Max   
Std. 
Dev. 
SEX 442 1 0.921 1 1 0 1 0.270 
AGE 442 47 50.966 51 54 34 67 5.912 
MBA 442 0 0.448 0 1 0 1 0.498 
MACC 442 0 0.014 0 0 0 1 0.116 
CPA 442 0 0.308 0 1 0 1 0.462 
CONT 442 0 0.634 1 1 0 1 0.482 
TREA 442 0 0.446 0 1 0 1 0.498 
PCFO 442 0 0.527 1 1 0 1 0.500 
ACC 442 0 0.294 0 1 0 1 0.456 
EXP 442 2 4.946 4 7 0 25 4.189 
SIZE 442 8.547 9.497 9.378 10.247 6.816 14.434 1.289 
SALARY 442 12.998 13.290 13.226 13.512 11.513 15.919 0.519 
TCOMP 442   14.322   14.758   14.818   15.169   12.003   17.022   0.671 
Continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1 CONTINUED 
 
Panel C: Medium Firms                         
VARIABLE N   Q1   Mean   Median   Q3   Min   Max   
Std. 
Dev. 
SEX 348 1 0.934 1 1 0 1 0.249 
AGE 348 46 50.681 51 55 35 68 6.265 
MBA 348 0 0.270 0 1 0 1 0.445 
MACC 348 0 0.040 0 0 0 1 0.197 
CPA 348 0 0.376 0 1 0 1 0.485 
CONT 348 0 0.626 1 1 0 1 0.484 
TREA 348 0 0.454 0 1 0 1 0.499 
PCFO 348 0 0.471 0 1 0 2 0.506 
ACC 348 0 0.359 0 1 0 1 0.481 
EXP 348 2 5.744 4 8 0 28 4.767 
SIZE 348 7.243 7.904 7.807 8.515 5.876 10.653 0.930 
SALARY 348 12.750 12.961 12.946 13.164 10.297 14.779 0.480 
TCOMP 348   13.683   14.078   14.120   14.442   11.467   16.132   0.639 
Continued 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 
UNIVARIATE CORRELATIONS AMONG VARIABLES 
 
  SEX AGE MBA MACC CPA CONT TREA PCFO ACC EXP TA SALARY TCOMP 
SEX 1.000 
 
AGE 0.070 1.000 
 
MBA -0.056 -0.002 1.000 
 
MACC 0.045 -0.038 -0.123 1.000 
 
CPA 0.006 -0.080 -0.126 0.106 1.000 
 
CONT -0.035 -0.014 -0.093 0.107 0.181 1.000 
 
TREA -0.117 0.035 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.070 1.000 
 
PCFO 0.011 0.089 0.148 -0.017 0.047 0.061 0.008 1.000 
 
ACC 0.008 -0.105 -0.181 0.130 0.537 0.170 -0.052 0.015 1.000 
 
EXP 0.005 0.355 -0.092 -0.087 -0.025 -0.006 0.089 -0.194 -0.027 1.000 
 
SIZE -0.009 0.082 0.117 -0.050 -0.097 -0.147 -0.047 0.019 -0.095 -0.065 1.000 
 
SALARY 0.014 0.125 0.052 -0.028 -0.069 -0.069 -0.066 0.062 -0.044 0.134 0.460 1.000 
 
TCOMP 0.003 0.113 0.167 -0.092 -0.129 -0.059 -0.053 0.104 -0.102 0.048 0.483 0.626 1.000 
 
 
 TABLE 3 
MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
This table presents regression results of CFO’s education/experience and the CFO compensation.  
The logs of salary and total compensation are the dependent variables. SEX is a dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 if a CFO is male. MBA, MACC, CPA are dummy variables that take a value of 1 if a CFO 
has an MBA, a M.Acc., and a CPA, respectively. CONT is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a CFO 
has worked as a controller before. TREA is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a CFO has worked 
as a treasurer before. PCFO is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the CFO had worked as a CFO 
at another company before he joined the current company.  ACC is a dummy variable that takes a value 
of 1 if the CFO has experience working for an accounting firm. EXP is the number of year a CFO has been 
working at the current company. SIZE is the log of company's total assets. (1) represents all sample firms 
(2) represents large firms and (3) represents medium firms. P-values are in parantheses. 
Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, *, respectively. 
  SALARY TCOMP 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
Intercept 11.380*** 11.328*** 12.018*** 11.920*** 12.458*** 13.065*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SEX 0.015 -0.009 0.063 0.021 -0.046 0.153 
(0.809) (0.917) (0.530) (0.813) (0.670) (0.262) 
AGE 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 
(0.638) (0.943) (0.481) (0.418) (0.619) (0.506) 
MBA 0.005 -0.009 -0.017 0.149*** 0.098 0.100 
(0.894) (0.850) (0.765) (0.002) (0.104) (0.203) 
MACC 0.047 0.042 0.058 -0.201 0.234 -0.322* 
(0.663) (0.828) (0.655) (0.173) (0.355) (0.068) 
CPA -0.037 0.037 -0.058 -0.115** -0.056 -0.117 
(0.376) (0.537) (0.320) (0.044) (0.479) (0.141) 
CONT 0.002 0.001 -0.033 0.053 -0.024 0.033 
(0.963) (0.983) (0.546) (0.279) (0.699) (0.658) 
TREA -0.063* -0.023 -0.108** -0.067 -0.010 -0.155** 
(0.060) (0.602) (0.034) (0.148) (0.871) (0.024) 
PCFO 0.092*** 0.086* 0.079 0.143*** 0.099 0.175** 
(0.007) (0.061) (0.128) (0.002) (0.102) (0.013) 
ACC 0.020 -0.058 0.091 0.002 -0.039 0.045 
(0.629) (0.338) (0.129) (0.974) (0.622) (0.571) 
EXP 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.016*** 0.016** 0.022*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.043) (0.006) 
SIZE 0.176*** 0.192*** 0.079*** 0.248*** 0.218*** 0.067* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.077) 
Adj-R 0.240 0.237 0.075 0.263 0.198 0.051 
N 790 442 348 790 442 348 
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